Money laundering dissertation

0)document actionsdownloadshare or embed documentembedview morecopyright: attribution non-commercial (by-nc)download as pdf, txt or read online from scribdflag for inappropriate contentthe control of money laundering in emerging economies: the case study of thailandsubmitted by torsak buranaruangrote in fulfillment of the dissertation requirement for the degree of doctor of philosophy (in law). For this purpose, the laundering offence and confiscation measures, both domestically and internationally, are discussed and suggestions are made for methods of enforcing those measures in order to make effective the control of money laundering in emerging economies in general and thailand in particular. The primary thesis is that states should design and enforce laundering and confiscation provisions in a manner that would overcome evidentiary problems relating to the proceeds of crime. Both money laundering and confiscation measures target the criminal proceeds, which often originate in the form of "money". As money is fungible and has no specific identity, identifying it for the purpose of these measures is very difficult and, in some cases, even impossible. In light of the fmdings in the previous chapters, chapter v makes suggestions for the effective enforcement of the repressive measures in emerging economies more generally and in thailand more of contents r i: evolution of money laundering control. Proving the criminal origin in case of mixed money 1) a mix of proceeds and legitimate money 2) a mix of proceeds from different crimes 3) a mix of proceeds from different occasions of crime 4) a mix of proceeds from crime committed before and after the criminalisation of money laundering 4. Identifying a confiscable part of property of a criminal originl38 1) a mix of proceeds and legitimate money 2) a mix of proceeds from different crimes 3) a mix of proceeds from different occasions of crime 4) a mix of proceeds from crime committed before confiscation and those from crime committed thereafter. Legal frameworks 1) international regime (1) the vienna convention (2) the money laundering convention 2) domestic regime (1) the uk (2) the us 4. 196 199 200 207 221 r v: the control of money laundering in emerging economies: thailand as a case study. Economic damage to the reputation of a country from being lack of integrity because it is used as a laundering channel can affect the willingness of economic agents. Money laundering" is defined as transferring illegally obtained money or investments through an outside party to conceal the true source. 8 banks and financial institutions involved in money laundering are likely to develop unstable liability base and unsound asset structure which would expose the financial system to the increased risk of instability within a country. The connection between them is underscored by the basel core principles for effective supervision and in the code of good practices on transparency in monetary and financial laundering poses a serious threat to their financial stability and it follows that there is a pressing need for them to effectively control money laundering. To attract foreign investments countries must have a system free of corruption and organised danger of money laundering to the integrity and stability of banks is explicitly recognised in the preamble of the basle statement of principle for the prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of moneylaundering 1988. One of the reasons may be that the implementation and enforcement of countermeasures against money laundering in the developed markets has driven criminals to turn to these emerging economies to launder the proceeds of crime. The control of money laundering is a necessary part of the larger scheme to the financial sector law reform in emerging economies to ensure the stability of the financial system. Controlling money laundering is the most effective way to fight against crimes that produce a significant amount of profits and therefore corruption'° and organised crime. Will be identified and responses will be made to address the problems in order to increase effectiveness in the control of money laundering in the emerging economies. Thesis question: this thesis asks what problems stand in the way of effective enforcement of anti-money laundering measures and what responses could be used to address those problems in the context of emerging economies.. The success of the control of money laundering depends not only on whether those measures exist under law but also on whether. Improving the fight against money laundering in thailand would contribute to the global efforts to contain drug fi. In a practioner's guide to international money laundering law and regulation 207-2 14 (andrew clark & peter burrell eds. 12 see the fatf forty recommendations 26-34 available at http:/ legal assistance for the confiscation purposes should be flexible to the most extent in order to be effective at international control of money laundering but this flexibility should not be made at the cost of the legality principle. Thesis: this thesis argues that the laundering offence and confiscation should be designed and applied in a manner that would overcome evidentiary problems relating to the proceeds of crime. The study of the thai regime to fight against money laundering will thus be useful to other apg members with regard to their regimes to control money laundering. The regime of each apg member in the control of money laundering would have to be assessed in light of the international standards in this regard. Chapters ii and iii examine the laundering offence and confiscation respectively using the uk and the us legislation as well as their case law. Chapter v examines the control of money laundering in emerging economies generally and in thailand d of identifying the suspect first. The term describes the conversion of cash by exchanging a volume of illegally earned currency for some types of negotiable instrument or other asset that can be used in commerce without revealing the illegal source of the funds used to purchase r i: evolution of money laundering laundering is one of the major crimes with which countries around the globe are most concerned. As one commentator has stated: money laundering essentially represents two distinct practices: "[ijn its first and most limited sense. Investigating authorities would first locate the proceeds which will be used as a lead to uncovering the crime that has generated them and its perpetrator or will be used as a basis for charging him or those laundering his proceeds on the laundering offence. It will be shown that the control of money laundering originated as a response to a number of hazards to the maintaining of the rule of law and the integrity and stability of the fmancial system caused by the rise of profit-motivated crimes and organised crime together with laundering the proceeds therefrom. It will further be shown that the control of money laundering may change the way law enforcement authorities conduct . This is in stark contrast with the second type of laundering which is clearly a process. Money launderers have now used a whole range of non-traditional fmancial institutions to introduce money into the system. The laundering process the laundering process is generally explained as composing of three stages: "placement". The underground banking business transfers money by using tokens considered within the structure of the system as having. It does not take account of the increasingly utilised underground banking business for placing the money into the system. The distinction between these two practices shows that money laundering need not be a process. This explanation does not reflect the reality of laundering currently practiced on a number of grounds. The placement stage under this model focuses on the introduction of "cash" into the laundering. Through which the money will be washed on a wave of spurious or misleading transactions. The limits of the law: an analysis of the interrelationship of the criminal and civil law in the control of money laundering. The transfer of money may then be made without actual movements of cash and conventional banking records. In the money trail: confiscation of proceeds of crime and cash transaction reporting 199-243 (brent fisse el al. Rider has observed: [t]he larger the organisation that is employed to launder the money. The laundering schemes of this nature look more like a mosaic and are especially likely in sophisticated laundering operations. It is important to note that the fatf stated: virtually every membei represented reported having experienced problems in pursuing anti-money laundering investigations with links to off-shore financial centres". It follows that the layering transactions would be complex only to the extent necessary for keeping the money beyond the relevant authorities. They need to transfer the money to places or countries where legal environments are conducive to laundering. Those who actually conduct money laundering may be other individuals and the perpetrator of the predicate crime might have little role in actual laundering activities. It does not mean that only the perpetrator of the predicate crime engages in money laundering. The use of the term "launderer(s)" has been avoided in our explanations on the laundering process. The overvaluation of imports allows them to explain that the money subsequently deposited at domestic banks is the payment for imported goods or the profit from the resale of such goods. This is why "money laundering" has been shortly defined as rendering the proceeds of gnisable as such. Laundering and its harms proceeds of tions or codes of conduct which require them to take precautions in regard to money laundering have been adopted. Professional bodies such as "the law society of england and wales" and "the institute of chartered accountants of england and wales" have provided their members with guidance on money laundering. Wealth unlawfully accumulated but successfully cleansed through laundering also allows it to acquire or penetrate legitimate businesses. On money laundering 13 (hector the us drug enforcement administration once said in 1978 before congress that we recognise that the conviction and incarceration of top-level traffickers does not necessarily disrupt trafficking organisation. Since laundering produces significant externalities in terms of costs upon the society from both laundering and the predicate crime. The purpose of laundering is to obscure the criminal origin of the funds and make them appear as having come from a legitimate source. The economic costs from laundering is not so obvious but can be appreciated from the directions of the movements of the flmds.. The public may be led to believe that decision-making process of the institutions is not market-based or even the bank staff could be bribed to conduct businesses in an unsafe and unsound manner for facilitating laundering. Evolution of money laundering control any discussions on the control of money laundering must begin with the examination of the us response to the is also recognised that capital market operates with efficiency only if the public has confidence in it. These hazards have led to the control of money laundering at both domestic and international levels. Congress passed the international money laundering abatement and anti-terrorist financing act (known as the patriot act) which extended the reporting obligation to foreign financial institutions which maintain interbank payable-through accounts or correspondent bank accounts with us fmancial institutions or other financial firms. Or transactions of primary money laundering concern to the us: -additional record-keeping or reporting for particular transactions. The guarding against money laundering is expressly included as one of the purposes of compliance programmes. The treasury secretary exercised this authority and these measures are now applicable to all us banks and certain foreign banks that are based on or operate in jurisdictions that have not adopted and implemented the fatf forty recommendations on money laundering and eight recommendations on terrorist fmance. A new anti-crime framework for the world: merging the objective and subjective models for fighting money laundering. This is because one of the concerns of the congress in enacting the bsa in 1970 was the infusion of criminal money particularly from organised crime activities into legitimate businesses. The lack of a separate laundering offence forced the prosecution to frame the charge against bank customers who laundered criminal funds on a violation of reporting requirements or conspiracy to defraud the government by obstructing the . Congress also authorises civil and criminal forfeiture of any property involved in any of the said money laundering offences or any property traceable to such property. 57 the mlca made it possible to pursue bank customers who sought to launder criminal proceeds on the laundering offence. Congress passed the money laundering control act (mlca) in 1986 creating a separate offence of money accurate reports.

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18 gh congress was aware of laundering the proceeds from organised criminal ing requirements or conspiracy to defraud the government by obstructing the filing of accurate reports which was more difficult. Had much to do with avoiding problems in the enforcement of the bsa but was much less concerned with the perception that laundering operations threatened the integrity and stability of the fmancial system. Fmancial institutions could possibly incur civil and criminal liabilities for money laundering in a case where they failed to observe obligations under the bsa. 58 the criminalisation of money laundering forced financial institutions under the threat of liabilities to fully comply with the requirements under the bsa. Congress might not have considered laundering as posing so serious a threat to financial integrity and stability that the conduct ought to have been criminalised. It did not criminalise laundering but simply introduced forfeiture of those proceeds and provided for certain obligations on financial institutions to facilitate the uncovering of those proceeds and the crime generating them. This is in stark contrast with switzerland where concerns about the negative effects of money laundering on its fmancial integrity were the forces behind its response. The examination of the us and swiss approaches to money laundering has demonstrated the stark contrast between the two at least on beginning. Given the fact that the reports could be used as a lead for investigation of the offence that has produced the proceeds and the laundering offence. The laundering offence could not substantially improve the repression of laundering unless the banks were permitted or required to disclose transactions suspected of money laundering to the authorities. We will see in the following section that actions against money laundering at the international and regional levels have adopted elements of both the us and the swiss approaches in this respect. The us-invented laundering offence and forfeiture of proceeds have been internationalised through the un convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 1988 adopted in vienna. It was only when disclosure was permitted in 1994 that the swiss fight against money laundering began to have repressive effects. The swiss control of money laundering should still be described as mostly preventive even after the criminalisation of money laundering in 1990. International and regional initiatives this section examines major initiatives that call for international and regional community to adopt measures to control money laundering. The un the un role in the fight against drug trafficking and drug money laundering was marked by the adoption of the un convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in ned. It requires parties to criminalise drug money laundering which is defined in article 3 as follows: -the conversion or transfer of property. It recognises as well the international nature of drug trafficking and drug money laundering and thus expressly contains provisions on mutual legal assistance generally 74 and with respect to confiscation specifically 75 as well as extradition76 in regard to drug-related offence or offences. The council of europe the most important product of the council of europe in the fight against money laundering is the convention on laundering. As the money laundering convention has as one of its purposes to deprive criminals of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime. The money laundering convention does not limit the predicate crime for the laundering offence to drug-related crimes but includes other criminal activities. Laundering of criminal proceeds is to be made illegal even though the predicate crime was not committed within the criminal jurisdiction of the concerned countries. In so far as illicit drug activities are view of these atory report on the convention on laundering search. The balse committee on banking regulations and supervisory practices in december 1988 the basle committee 82 issued a statement in which it acknowledged that money laundering can undermine public confidence in banks and their stability. The predicate crime for the purpose of money laundering covers a broad range of criminal activities 87 not only drug related crimes. This thesis will not cover the role of these bodies in shaping the fight against money laundering in their respective regions. Established in the g-7 summit held in paris in july 1989 as a response to concerns about negative implications off money laundering on the fmancial system. Both repression and prevention the financial action task force (fatf) the fatf is an inter-government organisation exclusively committed to fighting money laundering. Suffice it to state that these bodies have adopted and made into their own many fatf recommendations in the fight against money laundering. As the fatf stated in its first report: "key stages for detection of money laundering operations are those where cash enters into the domestic fmancial system. The reason for this emphasis is that money laundering is most likely to be detected at the point where the proceeds first enter the legitimate financial system. 05 the fatf also suggests that countries consider apply the recommendations to businesses and professions other than designated non-fmancial businesses and professions that pose a risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. It should be noted that more than half of the recommendations in this group are devoted to help financial institutions detect potential money laundering. Comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to effectiveness and efficiency of the systems to control money laundering and terrorist financing should be maintained to enable concerned authorities to review effectiveness of the systems. 1 ' it further calls for countries to equip supervising authorities with power to monitor and ensure compliance with the requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and power to impose administrative penalties for failure to comply with these requirements. Or to compel production of financial records held by fmancial ines and provide feedback which will assist the institutions in applying national measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. And disseminating suspicious transaction reports and other information on potential money laundering) 09 it also suggests that countries authorise law enforcement officers to use special investigative methods. The twin-track control of money laundering the strategy that aims both to prevent and repress money laundering is now known as the twin-track control of money laundering. It is therefore important to consider what crimes constitute the predicate crimes for the purpose of the laundering offence. The fatf forty recommendations would certainly be a blueprint for a programme of actions against money laundering for the international community as a whole. It is even more so with the latest version of the forty recommendations which were revised in light of change in laundering technques.. 9 the influence of the fatf in shaping the global fight against money laundering cannot be over-estimated. The commentary to it notes that the drug-related crime may be committed outside the jurisdiction of the country which criminalises drug money 1aundering. 121 it should be noted that the un has stated in regard to the application of money laundering to other offences. Limiting the application of the laundering offence to only proceeds for drug trafficking creates practical difficulties and unacceptable situations in both domestic and international contexts. 2' another aspect relates to the application of the laundering offence to the proceeds from a foreign predicate crime. There would seem to be little policy justification for proscription of money laundering arising from some profitgenerating criminal activities and not profit. The money laundering convention expressly provides that the laundering offence applies to the proceeds from a predicate crime committed abroad. 2 (a) adopted as part of the political declaration and action plan against money laundering at the twentieth special session of the un general assembly devoted to "countering the world drug problem together" in new is the case in the money laundering convention' 29 and the palermo convention. 27 there is also an issue whether the laundering offence applies to the perpetrator of the predicate crime. The laundering offence in the pca 2002 requires knowledge or suspicion of property being criminal property. Its commentary notes that the laundering offence could be committed by the perpetrator of the predicate crime. Subsequent conventions leave this issue to countries to decide whether the laundering offence should be made applicable to the perpetrator of the predicate crime. Preventive measures refer to obligations of designated institutions to take certain actions to discourage money laundering. The institutions are encouraged or required to take the following measures to prevent money laundering: identifying customers. In many focus should therefore be on those likely to be related to money laundering. As has been observed: transactions suspected of money laundering will be detected only when the institutions are able to match information on the transactions obtained through due diligence with data from a customer and even their knowledge of his performance over some time. Due diligence institutions are to properly examine the transactions to ensure that they are not likely to be related to money laundering. This alone often is inadequate to know whether the transactions are obligation alone cannot repress money laundering. L'his obligation serves this objective to the extent that criminals would be deterred from laundering by the keeping of the customer identification and executed transactional records which may be further used by investigators. Record-keeping obligation the purpose of this duty is to produce a paper trail for use as evidence in subsequent criminal investigations into money laundering. They must also contain sufficient information that would enable law enforcement authorities to re-constitute individual transactions that have been entered into for laundering purpose. Most instruments relevant to money laundering have set a minimum standard of five years for the record-keeping requirement. The purpose of this obligation is to supply information as to potential money laundering to the authority (financial intelligence unit—flu)'52 for further investigations. The process of laundering is in general involved the systems which are not easily accessible to investigators. The reporting obligation should also be considered preventive to the extent that criminals avoid laundering for fear that the transactions would be reported to the flu. Since this model requires the filing of the reports above the specified mount without regard to the probability of the transactions involving money laundering. 155 note that some of these countries also require the filing of reports in cases where transactions are not above the specified amount but are suspected of money s similar to those in the records-keeping obligation. A number of criminal activities that generate substantial amounts of proceeds and money laundering are victimless. The reason for this reporting obligation is that in practice it is very difficult for the investigators to uncover money laundering on their own efforts. Requires the filing of a report only where the institutions have already determined that a particular transaction is suspected of money laundering.. The requirement that the institutions implement proper and adequate systems to guard against money laundering to be examined later on also helps improve their capacity in detecting suspicious transactions. Note also that the authority allowing the execution of the transaction has a defence against the laundering offence. 78 while it does not state whether the institutions are liable for money laundering in this case. Introduction of compliance programmes the institutions are fmally to introduce internal compliance programmes designed to increase their ability to detect and prevent money rly. This is probably because the institutions can argue that they have done all they could to prevent money laundering and thus should not be liable for money laundering that has occurred particularly on the wilful blindness theory.

Also further the repression of money laundering in that those measures enhance the ability of the institutions to detect money laundering. Would enable them to make more useful reports to the authority for investigations into money laundering. Measures to control money laundering have been grouped into the categories of repression and prevention. The existence of compliance programmes may be used as a defence against criminal and civil liabilities including forfeiture as a result of money laundering. Their employees will be more able to provide relevant information as to possible money laundering to the authority. It is often known as the "follow-the-money-trail" approach comprising of the laundering offence and confiscation. Money laundering control: an effective way to fight against profitdriven and organised crime as examined. Would be used as the investigatory lead to uncovering the crime that has produced them and its perpetrator or to build a case on the basis of the laundering offence against such perpetrator. The focal point in controlling money laundering is identification of the proceeds of crime as an investigatory lead to uncovering the crime.. This is because the prosecution may be able to prove the crime which is the source of the proceeds in the laundering offence without identifying a specific act of the crime. The laundering offence is in essence any dealing in the proceeds of crime for the purpose of disguising their criminal origin. 88 it should not then be a surprise that the head of investigations of uk prosecuting agency has observed that "more than 30% of the cases handled by his agency would have been brought to trial one year earlier has they also been considered for laundering charges. Given the fact that the proceeds often originate in the form of money which is fungible and has no specific identity. The laundering offence enables the pursuit of the leaders at the point where they are most observable and vulnerable: the surfacing of unexplainable wealth. The laundering gaps that were not heretofore adequately addressed in the combat against organised crime will be closed. The result is the global recognition of the control of money laundering as an effective way to fight against those crimes. Since mechanisms for international criminal law enforcement in respect of money laundering are already in place: the vienna convention and the money laundering convention. The rise of profit-driven and organised crime together with laundering the proceeds thereof is dangerous to the maintaining of the rule of law and economic and financial ls. The us and switzerland were among the first countries to respond to the dangers in this regard by implementing measures to control money laundering. Controlling money laundering is also important in the fight against organised crime which has been known to operate on a cross-border deals with the criminal aspect of the control of money laundering. It will therefore be the principal argument in this chapter that the laundering offence will be capable of being effectively used only if it is approached in a way that overcomes the difficulties arising from the monetary form of the proceeds. To successfully control money r ii: comparative examination of the uk and the us laundering first chapter has shown that controlling money laundering is the most effective way to fight against profit-driven crime and organised crime. There must always be the crime which is the source of the proceeds before laundering can take place. The laundering offence would be examined and we will leave confiscation to be explored in chapter iii. The examination of the laundering offence here is conducted with a view to making it capable of being effectively used as a weapon in this regard. The likely lack of direct evidence and laundering techniques further the difficulties in this regard. It is impossible to prove the criminal origin of money by relying on its particulars. As money laundering is in essence an act to conceal or disguise the proceeds of crime. The nature of the laundering offence the laundering offence is a type of derivative offence which has been described as crime an element of which involves proof that a primary offence was committed or was intended to be committed. The extension of criminal liability for laundering in the case of the perpetrator of the crime should be properly structured in order to make the laundering offence capable of being effectively used in this regard. 3 the perpetrator whose crime has produced the proceeds can commit the laundering offence with respect to his own proceeds. The uk had three pieces of legislation on money laundering: the drug trafficking act (dta) l994. Comparative examination of the uk and the us laundering offence: selected aspects the relevant provisions in the uk and the us legislation are set out below. Act consolidated the laundering offence in section 24 in the drug trafficking offences act (dtoa) 1986 and the laundering offence in section 14 of the criminal justice co-operation act (cjco) 1990.. Use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another pca was enacted which created money laundering offences applicable to proceeds from any crime. The us the legislation that provides for the laundering offence is the money laundering control act (mlca) 1986. 1956 and 1957 section 1956: offence of laundering monetary instrument this section makes it an offence for any the contrary. Comparative aspects 1) the mental state the definition of "criminal property" in the pca 2002 makes it that the uk laundering offence requires knowledge or suspicion of the property concerned being criminal property. These professionals are involved in money laundering because of their expertise in the relevant fields. There are two kinds of third parties who may be involved in laundering: those whose professions are conducive to furthering laundering or the so called "professional launderers. See also review of the anti-money laundering system in 22 council of europe member states [hereinafter ec review] and i'ee on crime problem: select commitfee of experts on the evaluation of anti-money launderingmeastjres. Proving this knowledge may be difficult in case of laundering the proceeds of the crime of another. A few reports have suggested with respect to the first issue that knowledge is too high a standard in the laundering offence.. These professionals are often subject to the relevant codes of conduct or guidelines designed to prevent money need not be the only purpose. Where laundering is grounded upon the concealment or disguise of the property of a criminal origin. Because money laundering may not involve cases where an inference of knowledge can reasonably be drawn. It has been suggested that the laundering (concealing) offence should not require the prosecution to prove the purpose to conceal or disguise the criminal origin of property. Of the most marked differences between the uk and the us with respect to the laundering offence is that the uk had three pieces of law that criminalised the activity: the dta 1994. An evidence of this may be found in the fatf observation that the us has far more convictions of money laundering than any other country even if the elements of the us laundering offence require both knowledge and purpose. Having different pieces of laws criminalising money laundering in this respect means that the defendant must be proved to know the crime of which the property is the proceeds. It must be proved that the knowledge of the defendant in this regard relates to the predicate crime for the laundering offence with which he is charged under the concerned legislation. Criminal liability of the receiver and the money launderer requires knowledge of the past criminal activity. The provision which prescribes various crimes as predicate crimes for the purpose of the laundering offence. This approach is different from the serious crime approach to making money laundering an offence. The legislation spells out criminal activities which serve as predicate crimes for the purpose of the laundering offence. There are costs associated with the criminalisation of money laundering on an any crime basis. The second approach is to criminalise laundering activities on an any crime basis--the any crime or all crime approach. The laundering offence in new zealand applies to crimes with a five-year minimum period of imprisonment. As urged by the money laundering convention and the fatf recommendation (unreported) court of appeal. It is submitted that the indictment for the laundering offence is not sufficiently particularised if what crime produced the property is not spelt out. It is submitted that these two cases do not support the position that the prosecution need not prove from what crime the proceeds are derived where the substantive laundering offence is at the issue.. The nature of the conspiracy crime is different from substantive laundering offence where the provenance of the proceeds. The court of appeal approved the practice of charging conspiracy to launder drug money or conspiracy to launder money from nondrug crimes... In these two this is clearly one of the difficulties faced by the prosecution in enforcing the laundering offence. Although any indictable offence is a predicate crime for the purpose of the laundering offence under the cja 1988. This right is also recognised under article 6 of the european convention on human rights which states "everyone charged with a criminal offence has the gh it is correct to assert that having different laws criminalising laundering the proceeds from different crimes causes a probative problem in this respect. 32 it would be wrong to assume that the consolidation of money laundering in the pca 2002 would solve the problem. The consolidation of the offence of laundering the proceeds of different crimes into one piece of legislation in the pca 2002 does not free the prosecution of this burden. Irrespective of whether money laundering is criminalised on a some crime or any crime basis. The government admitted that it is likely that the asset recovery agency would have to identify the crime which produced the should be noted that many international instruments indirectly suggest that countries should make the laundering offence applicable to the perpetrator of the predicate crime. 36 law enforcement officers may lose sight of what money laundering law is principally aimed at. 4) the predicate crime perpetrator and the laundering offence in both the uk and the us. The any crime approach to the laundering offence also permits the offence to be used on a broader basis without defining what crime is covered and therefore makes it unnecessary to keep reviewing and updating the law. It is submitted that the criminalisation of money laundering on any crime basis is undesirable. The focus of money laundering should be on cases where traditional offences are not likely to be successful as in the case of organised crime. It has been noted that the current laundering offence covers many types of conducts which would normally be prosecuted under the theft act 1968 provisions.

To criminalise laundering activity on any crime basis would bring into money laundering investigations a number of petty offences such as simple thefts which are appropriately dealt with through traditional criminal offences. This would seem to suggest that the laundered proceeds must be proved to be derived from his convicted conspiracy offence which has also to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain his conviction on money laundering. The laundering offence in section 49(1) of the dta 1994 applies to a person who launders the proceeds of "his" drug trafficking. 1991) where the is a drug dealer is found guilty of laundering the proceeds of his drug trafficking. It is submitted that this is inconsistent with the use for which the laundering offence is designed. The prosecution charged the defendant with laundering of the proceeds of his conspiracy offence under section 93c(1) of the cia 1988. The explanatory report notes that these sections apply to the laundering of an offender's own crime proceeds as well as those of someone else. The uk has now in the pca 2002 dispensed with proof of the perpetrator of the predicate crime in respect of the laundering offence. This shows that the laundering offence is likely to be a viable alternative against individuals against whose evidence on the basis of the crime that produced the laundered proceeds is ndt sufficient. Proving the criminal origin of the proceeds: evidentiary problems in money laundering in a prosecution for money laundering. It is then suggested that where the laundering offence is applicable to the perpetrator of the predicate crime. It was held that acquittal of the defendant on particular mail fraud counts did not require acquittal on money laundering where the jury could have found that property being laundered was proceeds of other parts of the fraud scheme. Proving that property is the proceeds of crime often involves proving that money is of a criminal origin. It would be virtually impossible to prove with direct proof that the money invested was the money derived from racketeering acts. The proving of the criminal origin of money generally one of the elements that the government has to prove in the prosecution of the laundering offence is that the property concerned is the proceeds of crime. That is not possible with respect to money because money has no particulars or specific identity and is fungible. This part examines difficulties in proving the criminal origin of money for the purpose of the laundering offence. Which has noted that in relation to the organised crime control act 1970 that [b]ecause money is fungible. 2002) as one commentator has is very difficult to prove that the money is the proceeds of crime. It is desirable that a guideline as to types of circumstantial evidence in this regard be developed which would help countries with a recent regime to control money laundering. 2) response given the fungibility and lack of specific identity of money as well as the likely lack of direct evidence. Money laundering is usually conducted through a whole range of fmancial services providers with virtually instantaneous service. The use of circumstantial evidence to prove the proceeds of crime in money laundering is therefore different and clearly more difficult. Given that laundering is designed to conceal or disguise or to prevent the tracing of the proceeds back to their criminal origin. A drug dealer's lack of sufficient income to explain large wire transfers implies that wired money is drug beginning our examination. It is useful to distinguish between own proceeds laundering and laundering the proceeds of the crime of someone else. Money laundering and drug trafficking: a question of understanding the elements of the crime and the use of circumstantial evidence. He has further divided each group into cases where the money is specifically and directly linked to a particular drug distribution and where the money cannot be traced to any particular drug deal. One commentator has divided patterns of prosecution for drug money laundering icant increases in cash banking. The court found that the payment for the plane is drug proceeds upon proof that the account from which the payment is made is fed by laundering operations. This is why it has been suggested that the laundering offence has a potential to be used as a surrogate against persons whose prosecution on the predicate crime could not succeed. Recall that money laundering may be divided into own proceeds laundering and laundering the proceeds of someone else. A conviction of the predicate crime in a given occasion may be used together with other evidence to support an inference that the money is the proceeds from other unidentified occasions of such crime. Evidence need show the commission of the predicate crime by the defendant charged with the laundering offence. The money found to be the drug proceeds was not specifically linked to the drug crime in the occasions of which they were note 50. Bank deposits and unit and not necessarily prove on the same standard that the person charged with money laundering committed the predicate crime. The advantage of the laundering offence in this regard is not available where own proceeds laundering is structured in a way that requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant is the perpetrator of the predicate crime to the criminal standard. Does not mean that proving the laundering offence is easier than proving the predicate crime. Or false documentation to conceal the identity as evidence to prove that the money was drug proceeds. The principal purpose of the control of money laundering is to fight against organised crime more effectively. The matters which the experts can testify include the need of criminals in engaging in money laundering. 7° it has therefore been correctly suggested that countries develop a database of experts in relevant aspects of money laundering so that they may be readily used in appropriate cases. It may also be argued on the basis of the fungibility of money that banks generally return to the depositor the requested amount without returning the very money deposited and thus. Money withdrawn from the account into which the drug proceeds were deposited is not the drug proceeds. The explanatory report to the money laundering convention noted that the "proceeds" in article 6 include substitute property. While article 3 of the vienna convention uses the word "property derived from an offence" in its defmition of the laundering offence. The credit in the account and the money withdrawn from this account are traceable proceeds. It is submitted that the holding equally applies to tracing in the laundering offence context. The subject of the laundering offence under the pca 2002 is criminal property which section 340(3) defines as property constituting a person's benefit from criminal conduct or representing such a benefit in whole or. The proving of the criminal origin in case of mixed money the previous sub-section has proposed that substitute property be considered traceable property. It has also been suggested in accordance with the exchange product tracing rule that the withdrawn money from the account into which the proceeds have been deposited is traceable proceeds. This sub-section explores four cases of mixing: a mix of proceeds of crime and legitimate money. It is submitted that the representative property in the laundering offence context is traceable property. It is in some cases impossible to link the withdrawn money to the part in the account which represents the proceeds of crime specified in the laundering charge. And a mix of proceeds from crime committed before and after the criminalisation of money laundering. Only when property is traceable to property constituting benefit from crime can the former be considered as a representative property and thus criminal property for the purpose of the laundering offence in the uk. It approved two rules to determine whether the withdrawn money is traceable proceeds: the "drug-in (tainted money-in). This is only true so far as concerns the laundering offence which requires only that the laundered property is partly tainted without having to identif' the tainted part. The rejection of the fungibility of money as a defence also applies to the case of mixed money. 76 but this is not sufficient since there are circumstances of mixing where it would be impossible to know with certainty whether the withdrawn money is the proceeds of crime. This means that criminal liability for laundering grounded upon the withdrawal transaction can simply be avoided by simply mixing the proceeds with legitimate money.. It explained that because the fungibility of money destroys the specific identity of any particular funds. The withdrawal of us $12000 is traceable drug proceeds and it follows that the withdrawal constitutes money laundering. Low-level associates who are commonly known as "smurfs" may be used to make criminal deposits but the principals may conduct further transactions to obscure the criminal origin of the money in the system. First-out provides a practical solution to the problem in proving the criminal origin of money in the case of mixed accounts. Criminal liability could be avoided by simply commingling because making a criminal deposit into a legitimate account also constitutes laundering under § 1956. Since the laundering charge may be grounded on the making of a criminal deposit however. It is possible that there may be cases where there is no evidence of the principals making the deposits but there is sufficient evidence to prove that the principals withdraw the money from the mixed account.. The problem is concerned with the impossibility of tying the withdrawn money to the predicate crime specified in the laundering charge. The balance in the mixed account dropped to zero after the sua proceeds were deposited and the issuing of cheques withdrawing money from this account. The balance goes to zero and thereafter becomes positive with a deposit of lawful money. The issue was whether the withdrawals through those cheques constituted money laundering in violation of § 1956. It is thus suggested as a response to the problem of mixing the proceeds and legitimate money that tracing should be completely eliminated. First-out rule that the withdrawn money up to the amount of the criminal deposit is the proceeds of crime. First-out" rule should be adapted with the effect that the withdrawal contains up to the amount of the proceeds from the specified predicate crime and it follows that the withdrawal constitutes money laundering. If the whole money or more than the proceeds from other crimes in the account (which may be evidenced by the dropping of the balance in the account below the deposit of the proceeds from the specified crime) is withdrawn.

Proving that the money in the transaction is the proceeds of the specified crime is not possible and the laundering offence based upon the withdrawal fails as a result. The transaction obviously involves the proceeds from the specified crime and therefore is money laundering. The lowest intermediate balance rule is a limitation to the traceability of the money in this approaches work only when the prosecution first proves that the account contains the proceeds from a specific occasion of the crime. Where the defendant is charged with the predicate crime on a specific occasion and the laundering offence with regard to the proceeds of the predicate crime generally. This is concerned with the case of own proceeds laundering structured in a way which does not require the proving on a criminal standard of the perpetrator of the predicate crime. The prosecution would seek to prove that the whole money in the account is the proceeds of crime without identifying occasions. The withdrawal from the account should be considered as containing up to the amount of the proceeds of crime on a specified occasion under the tainted money-in. It was held that acquittal on particular mail fraud counts did not require acquittal on the laundering offence where the jury could have found that property being laundered was proceeds of other parts of the fraud scheme. This supports the point made earlier that evidence sufficient on a criminal standard to prove the crime impossibility is particularly relevant in countries with recent legislation on money laundering.. It was held that where the laundering charge alleges the sua by referencing specific counts in the indictment. A person must be convicted of the predicate crime and the laundering offence at the same time. In the specific link ed the laundered proceeds need not be sufficient on the same standard that "a person" charged with laundering commits such crime. If the prosecution simply institutes the laundering charge against the defendant without also charging the predicate crime from which the proceeds come. This enables the laundering offence to be used successfully where pursuing the perpetrator of the predicate crime on a particular occasion is likely to fail due to insufficiency of evidence. 4) a mix of proceeds from crime committed before and after the criminalisation of money laundering (1) problem proceeds from crime committed before and after the effective date of the laundering offence may be mixed. The defendant charged with own proceeds laundering must be acquitted even if evidence supports the existence of other occasions of the crime from which the proceeds are derived. Is to make the laundering offence applicable to proceeds from act of laundering must be committed after the effective date of money laundering. The court held that "proceeds" includes proceeds of drug offences committed before the effective date of the money laundering statute in 1986. The principal conclusion is that the monetary nature of the proceeds makes it difficult or even practically impossible to prove the criminal origin of the proceeds for the purpose of money laundering. It is therefore no ex post facto violation when the laundering charge is based on a laundering act committed after the effective date of the laundering offence. It is submitted that the making the laundering offence applicable as such does not violate this prohibition. It is not a retroactive application of the laundering offence but the application of the offence to the proceeds of the predicate crime committed before its effective date. Concluding remarks this chapter has examined the laundering offence in the uk and the us in comparison with a view to making it capable of being used as an effective weapon against crime. Laws on confiscation of the proceeds of crime have been introduced or been r iii: comparative examination of the uk and us chapter focuses on another component of the repressive measures to control money laundering: confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Article i of the money laundering convention defines "confiscation" as a penalty or a measure. The difference between these two conventions is that confiscation under the vienna convention need not be the order of a court but the money laundering convention requires that it must be rfeit money. 2) value confiscation a value confiscation order is an order requiring a convicted person to pay a sum of money based on an assessment of the value of the criminal proceeds. The proceeding did not involve the determination of a criminal charge and it followed that the making of a forfeiture order against the seized money was not in violation of the right to be presumed innocent in article 6(2). It is clear that proceeds confiscation somehow depends in reality on the finding of culpability whether of the crime which generated the proceeds or the laundering offence. The non-conviction-based regime will enable the recovery of unlawful gains held by individuals who protect themselves from prosecution through complex money laundering schemes. A criminal confiscation order is an order to a convicted defendant to pay a sum of money equal to the benefit he has obtained from a crime. A money judgment in the forfeitable amount without tracing the taint into specific property of the defendant at the time of forfeiture. The representative property is explores the proving of the criminal origin of money in general and. The proving of the criminal origin of money generally 1) original property (1) problem as with the laundering offence. 6 the sources of the difficulties in this respect include the fungibility and lack of specific identity of money and the likely lack of direct evidence due to the victimless nature of many proceeds-generating crimes. The concepts of money judgment and substitute property in criminal forfeiture are not available in civil forfeiture. The extensive use of circumstantial evidence is unlikely to be sufficient to prove the criminal origin of money in the confiscation context. Review of fa tf anti-money laundering systems and mutual evaluation procedures 1992-1999 [hereinafter fatf review]. See peter alldridge, money laundering law: forfeiture, confiscation, cwil recovery, criminal laundering and taxation of the proceeds of crime 148 (2003) and a. The money laundering convention adopts the wide definition of the term "proceeds" which includes substitute property.. 50 (1) problem since the problem has already been noted at some length in the laundering offence context in chapter ii. Identifying the confiscable part of the property of a criminal origin in the laundering offence. This aspect makes proceeds confiscation difficult in case of mixing since the proceeds of crime are often money and. 1996) where the court did not allow the forfeiture of property unless it was traceable to the laundered money. 1 986)(noting in dicta that "if us $100 from the sale of drugs is deposited in an account funded with untainted money. 982 which is money laundering forfeiture statute explicitly requires that property to be forfeited be traceable to the crime or there be traceable connection between property and the crime. It is similar to the case of mixed money in that the criminal part of the property is unidentifiable.. 59 it should be noted that this approach may also be used in case where the amount of the proceeds are known by way of the application of the banco "tainted money-in. They are directly forfeitable even if this account also has legitimate money when they have been deposited. There is no need to separate proceeds of crime from legitimate money when both are mixed in any manner. The fact that it is impossible to identify the tainted part in the mixed money is no obstacle in the value confiscation property is recoverable to the extent of the us $10. The fact that the government cannot identify the "proceeds" part of the mixed money in the account is no obstacle to forfeiture. It considers that the portion of the mixed property which is attributable to the recoverable property represents the property obtained through unlawful ational guide to money laundering law and practice 100 (toby graham ed. It is not necessary to determine the amount of the drug proceeds under either the "tainted money-in. The proceeds would be considered as property involved in money laundering which need not be specifically identified. Forfeiture must be based on involvement of property in the laundering offence which according to the us case law includes facilitation. The forfeiture of property on the basis of its involvement in money laundering brings a problem of disproportion. Should be rejected as a way to solve the identification impossibility in case of mixed money. The court explicitly said: "the authorisation of the money judgments in cases the government cited to support its position was held for a policy reason. Money judgment is not truly consistent with the nature of forfeiture which is enforceable against tainted property only. The courts should not be legally able to make a forfeiture order against legitimate property in the form of a money judgment. It seems at odds with the statutes for courts to forfeit legitimate property with no connection whatsoever to money laundering. This also unnecessarily burdens the government in that it must prove both the predicate crime and money laundering to obviate tracing and to overcome the lowest intermediate balance rule. There are no reasons why the forfeiture in the suggested manner should be limited only to mixing which constitutes money laundering. It is submitted that the measures outlined in case of a mix of the proceeds and legitimate money may be adapted to cope with this . And the forfeiture of the entire balance including legitimate money as facilitating property may be used to solve the identification impossibility caused by mixing. Since proceeds from other crimes in the account may facilitate the concealment or disguise of the proceeds of crime specified in the laundering charge which is grounded on the making of a deposit of the proceeds of the specified ns 6(4)(b). Support for this may be found in article 5(7) of the vienna convention which advocates the reversal of burden of proof in the confiscation context but not in the laundering offence context. Particularly where the destination of those proceeds is a state whose anti-money laundering system is lax. There are differences as to the definition of the laundering offence as well as the ranges. It will be shown that although legal measures to control money laundering in many states are similar. The transnational nature of money laundering also explains why the implementation of measures to control money laundering around the globe is largely a product of international and regional initiatives as examined in chapter i. The movement of the proceeds of crime abroad is one of the marked characteristics of the operation of sophisticated laundering operations and organised as where evidence of the crime is. The injunction was served on the branch of the irish bank in the uk but it prohibited the bank in ireland from giving the money to the defendant. Mutual legal assistance in obtaining information as to the whereabouts of the proceeds and in preserving them for the 4 article 5 of the vienna convention and article 14 of the money laundering convention. The relevant provisions in this respect in these conventions follow substantially the approaches of the vienna and/or the money laundering conventions.

2) the money laundering convention this is a specific convention and is by far the most comprehensive convention dealing with confiscation assistance. The money laundering convention provides two options for the requested state to render confiscation assistance: either to initiate a proceeding to obtain a domestic confiscation order or to directly enforce a confiscation order made by the court in the requesting state) 3 ' recognising that the first approach is only possible where the requested state has competence under its own law to institute a confiscation proceeding. While the measures to control money laundering in many states are the product of obligations states have assumed upon being parties to the international instruments. This would unavoidably lead to differences in many aspects of anti-money laundering measures in many states. The money laundering convention provides for a number of grounds for refusing assistance most of which relates to the differences in the laws relating to money laundering and confiscation between the requesting and requested states. 2 there is no longer a need to institute a domestic forfeiture proceeding or prove the laundering offence. The money laundering convention treats the differences in respect of those measures between the requesting and requested states as optional grounds for refusal. Forfeiture or confiscation judgment is a final order of a foreign nation compelling a person or entity to pay a sum of money representing the proceeds of an offence described in article 3(1) of the vienna convention. It will only explore the grounds for refusal which are caused by the differences in aspects of the legal measures against money laundering between the requesting and requested be optional. Should be noted at the outset that this part is not intended to offer a comprehensive review of mutual legal assistance for the purpose of confiscation under the vienna or the money laundering conventions. Definition of money laundering (a) double criminality double criminality is a requirement that the activity which is the basis of the request. In addition to the activity being a crime in both double criminality in respect of the drug money laundering offence would always be fulfilled. The us laundering offence dge of the criminal origin of property while the uk offence permits suspicion. Investigative assistance may be refused and the effectiveness of the international fight against money laundering would be thereby adversely affected. B) response it is submitted that the double criminality requirement should be double criminality requirement is likely to be a problem in mutual legal assistance where the offence to which the request relates is laundering proceeds of crimes other than drugs. Even if states are to apply the laundering offence to proceeds of serious crime or even any crime. 19 because predicate crimes for the purpose of the laundering offence may be different in many states. Thereby the lack of double criminality in regard to this offence and also the laundering offence. Every state party to the vienna convention must criminalise a wide range of drug activities which are predicate crimes for the purpose of the drug money laundering offence.. Especially in the context of money laundering where there are differences as to the defmition of the laundering offence in many states. The money laundering convention allows the requested state to refuse assistance in these two situations. Second, the money laundering convention provides for the making of the request for provisional measures assistance either before or after a confiscation has been ordered. However, the money laundering convention limits the possibility of making a request for provisional measures assistance where a confiscation has not yet been made to cases where the requesting state has already instituted a criminal proceeding or a proceeding for the purpose of confiscation. Definition of money laundering (a) double criminality the money laundering convention allows for this type of assistance to be refused on ground of the lack of double criminality. Seesupraat the basis of the request is the laundering offence, the condition of double criminality is a potentially significant obstacle to provisional measures assistance, particularly due to the difference in the scope of predicate crimes. One of the grounds that would make the requested state unable to provide confiscation assistance, although it is not explicitly provided in either the vienna or the money laundering conventions, is where doing so would engage the requested state in a violation of the legality principle. If the requested state cannot provide confiscation assistance with respect to property sought to be made subject to provisional measures, the taking of those measures will not fulfil the eventual purpose and, for this reason, provisional measures assistance will be likely to be refused, although this refusal is not so required under the money laundering convention. In conclusion, although the money laundering convention provides for the lack of double criminality as an optional ground for refusal of provisional measures assistance, it is suggested that the lack of double criminality will be an optional refusal ground in this regard only if the requested state renders confiscation assistance by way of direct enforcement of a confiscation order issued in the requesting state. B) response in order to be most effective in the international control of money laundering. The rendering of provisional measures assistance would be fast and effective in tackling the reality of international money laundering that. The rendering of provisional measures assistance would not fulfil the purpose of the the money laundering convention puts both systems of confiscation on an equal footing and requires that states be able to provide assistance in respect of both confiscation systems. The money laundering convention allows the requested state to refuse confiscation assistance in three circumstances of this nature. This may explain why the money laundering convention obliges states to provide for provisional measures with respect to all offences and cannot limit this obligation to certain offences or categories of offences. It should be noted that the explanatory report to the money laundering convention explained that provisional measures assistance should not be refused simply because the law of the requested state does not provide for confiscation in respect of the offence to which the request cation assistance in these circumstances is not legally possible. It should be recalled that the vienna and the money laundering conventions do not require that confiscation be made in a criminal proceeding and therefore confiscation need not be conviction-based. The money laundering convention does not mandate the refusal of assistance in case of non-conviction-based confiscation. Refusal of assistance negatively affects the international fight against money laundering which would mean that full deprivation of the criminal of the proceeds of crime is not achieved. This would appear to be contrary to the position noted by the explanatory report to the money laundering convention. 3) confiscation the money laundering convention provides for two forms of confiscation assistance: direct enforcement of the order made in the requesting state or initiation of a proceeding to obtain a domestic confiscation order. Definition of money laundering (a) double criminality this has already been examined in the context of provisional measures assistance and it will not be repeated here. It should be recalled that the money laundering convention alllows the requested state to refuse confiscation assistance where confiscationi is not enforceable or is not final under the law of the requesting state. Given the differences in many aspects of legal measures to control money laundering in many states. As the money laundering convention in its current form provides for the refusal of assistance on the unenforceable or non-fmal nature of the confiscation order issued in the requesting e 10. Concluding chapter has examined international control of money laundering in one aspect: the confiscation of proceeds of crime located abroad. Confiscation and international confiscation r v: the control of money laundering in emerging economies: thailand as a case chapter is concerned with the control of money laundering in emerging economies in general and thailand in particular. The criminalisation of laundering the proceeds of different crimes in different pieces of legislation leads to an evidentiary problem. Its purpose is to make suggestions as to the improvement of the enforcement of the repressive measures against money laundering. It should be noted that thailand is a member of the asia pacific group (apg) on money laundering of which mission is to facilitate the adoption. 2 note that the apg already conducted the review of the existing regime to control money laundering in thailand in 2001. The laundering offence may be successfully used against the perpetrator of the predicate crime in case where evidence against him on the predicate crime may not be sufficient. This enables the laundering offence to be used as an indirect tool to fight against proceedgenerating crimes. We have further suggested that the laundering offence should apply to the perpetrator of the predicate crime without it being explicitly provided as in the us. Even when laundering the proceeds of different crimes is criminalised in a single piece of legislation. We have also suggested that the laundering offence should require both knowledge as to the criminal origin of property and the purpose to conceal or disguise its criminal origin. This would offer evidentiary benefit since it is possible to prove the predicate crime for the purpose of the laundering offence to the criminal standard without necessarily establishing on this standard that the defendant charged with laundering is the perpetrator withdrawal contains traceable proceeds up to the criminal deposit. We have suggested that circumstantial evidence should be extensively used for this purpose and also that this circumstantial evidence may be divided into four groups: involvement in the predicate crime of the defendant or of the person for whom he engages in laundering. It is very difficult to prove this link for a number of reasons: the fungibility and lack of specific identity of money and the likely lack of direct evidence due to victimless nature of many proceeds-generating crimes and laundering techniques. Where the defendant proves that the account contains more of the legitimate money or the proceeds of crime other than that specified in the laundering charge than the withdrawn amount.. And a mix of proceeds of crime committed before the effective date of the laundering offence and those from crime committed thereafter. Is subject to the lowest intermediate balance rule under which no traceable proceeds will remain if the balance ever becomes zero before the withdrawal in which case it is no laundering. In cases of mixing proceeds from many occasions of crime and proceeds from crime committed before the laundering offence becomes effective and those of crime thereafter committed. The absence of the third case of laundering does not mean that thailand fails to fulfill its obligation in this respect. The fatf in 2003 has noted with regard to predicate crime that the laundering offence should apply to all serious crimes which. It is submitted that in determining what criminalities to be included as predicate crime for the laundering offence. The pca 2002 provides explicitly that the laundering offence is applicable to proceeds from foreign crime which would constitute a crime in the the uk. It is in this aspect that the thai laundering offence does not meet the fatf demand. What matters is that the launderer must have this purpose at the time of laundering which. Section 5 governs both own proceeds laundering and laundering the proceeds of crime of someone else. The first level substitute property is in (2) which is money or property derived from the distribution. In (1) property connected with the commission of an offence is money or property derived from the commission of a predicate crime or aiding and abetting thereof. The following should be added to the definition of the term "property connected with the commission of an offence: (3) money or property derivedfrom a series of transactions of which the first transaction is one involving property in 1. We have noted that the lowest intermediate balance rule which limits the traceability of the money in the mixed account. The legislation should explicitly provide that the predicate crime which generates the proceeds includes those committed before the laundering offence becomes effective. As long as it is shown that the first of the series of transactions whereby property is obtained involves the money or property directly derived from predicate crime. It is not likely to be used in case of mixing proceeds from different occasions of crime and a mix of proceeds from crimes committed before the effective date of the laundering offence and those committed thereafter. The lowest intermediate balance rule is no as the first transaction involves money or property directly derived from predicate of the responses.

This is particularly difficult where convicted criminals have engaged in crime for a number of times and/or in many criminal with the laundering offence context. We have examined the impossibility of making the identification in this respect in four situations: a mix of proceeds and legitimate money. And money or property derived from using such money or property to purchase or from taking action in any manner to convert such money or property. Property connected with the commission of an offence is defined as money or property derived from the commission of a drug-related offence. It may be considered that traceable property is obtained and therefore proceeds from money laundering. The issue left is whether the psma authorises confiscation of property laundered or proceeds from money laundering. It is only in this case that proceeds from money laundering are confiscable under the psma. Those of his money or property beyond his status or capability of engaging in lawful occupation or other activities are presumed to be drug proceeds. We have in chapter ii rejected the view that the laundering offence should be applicable to the proceeds of any crime. Since transferring money pursuant to the order does not discharge its obligation to return money to the defendant who is the account holder. We have examined mutual legal assistance for confiscation purposes under the vienna convention and the money laundering convention. The money laundering convention allows a refusal of assistance where investigative and provisional measures sought do not exist or could not be taken under the law of the requested state. We have suggested that the provision of confiscation assistance in these circumstances is not legally possible notwithstanding their being optional refusal grounds under the money laundering convention. The vienna convention and the money laundering convention allow the requested state to either directly enforce a confiscation order issued in the requesting state. Incorporates and makes mandatory a number of optional refusal grounds in the money laundering t. The repressive measures against money laundering in thailand have been used as a case for study. We have noted a tiumber of suggestions drawn on the previous chapters to emerging economies with a view to making enforcement of the repressive measures against money laundering effective. The property would be proceeds of crime or is of a criminal origin only if it is shown to have been acquired with the original criminal money. The principal purpose of this thesis is to examine problems in relation to the enforcement of these measures and suggest ways to address these problems in order to make the measures more effective against money laundering. That what is to be proved as having a criminal origin for the purpose of the laundering offence and confiscation may not be money but may be any kind of property. Particularly the un convention against illicit traffic narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 1988 and the convention on laundering. There are others factors which pose further difficulty in proving that money is the proceeds of crime. Money laundering is an activity the purpose of which is to conceal or disguise the proceeds of crime and make them appear as having come from a legitimate source. There are no victims who can provide useful information as to the criminal origin of money in the possession of targeted individuals. This means that the fact that money is the proceeds of crime has to be established even in such cases. It has focused on criminal aspects of anti-money laundering measures: the laundering offence and confiscation. Proceeds of crime often originate in the form of sion this thesis is about the control of money laundering in emerging economies using thailand as a case study. It is clear that both the laundering offence and confiscation should be structured and applied in a way that would properly address the evidentiary problems in respect of the proceeds of crime in order to be effective. It would be impossible to prove in each case that the withdrawal contains the proceeds of crimes specified in the laundering charge in case the withdrawn amount is less than the legitimate money. The account may contain no traceable proceeds if the balance in the account goes to nil after the last criminal deposit and before the making of the withdrawal under the lowest intermediate balance disguise the criminal origin of money. And a mix of proceeds from crime committed before effective date of the laundering offence or confiscation and those from crime committed laundering offence should be made applicable to proceeds of crime. The laundering offence 1) circumstantial evidence should be extensively admitted to prove the criminal origin of the proceeds. This is to address circumstances where it would be impossible to trace the withdrawn money back to the proceeds of crime or the proceeds of specified crime contained in the account. This is to compensate for the likely lack of direct evidence due to the flingibility and lack of specific identity of money as well as the absence of the victims.. Nor should the crime which is the source of the proceeds be limited to that which is committed only after the effective date of the laundering offence. 3) a withdrawal from a mixed account should always be considered to contain the proceeds of crime and thus constitute money laundering without the need to trace the withdrawn amount back to the criminal part in the account. This suggestion would be mostly used in case the proceeds are mixed with legitimate money. The money laundering convention recognises the differences in this regard as optional grounds for refusal of assistance. One of the most important international controls of money laundering examined in this thesis is the confiscation of the proceeds of crime located abroad. A number of international instruments concerned with money laundering provide for a system of mutual legal assistance to address the international scope of money laundering. Many optional grounds for refusal of confiscation assistance under the money laundering convention cannot be optional. In order to facilitate mutual legal assistance for confiscation purposes which in turn furthers effectiveness in the international control of money ing confiscation. States should directly enforce a confiscation order issued in the requesting state which would avoid the problems with respect to the legality principle caused by the differences in laws on money laundering between the requesting and requested states in the above circumstances. Money laundering and drug trafficking: a question of understanding the elements of the crime and the use of circumstantial evidence". The money laundering control act of 1986: creating a new federal offence or merely affording federal prosecutors an alternative means of punishing specified unlawful activity". International co-operation to combat money laundering: the nature and role of mutual legal assistance treaties". A new anti-crime framework for the world: merging the objective and subjective models for fighting money laundering". The council of europe laundering convention: a recent example of a developing international criminal law". The limit of the law: an analysis of the interrelationship of the criminal and civil law in the control of money laundering". Money laundering and associated issues: the need for international on the model treaty on extradition and manual on the model treaty on mutualassistance in criminal matters: an implementation guide. What does not and what is ended documentsdocuments similar to thesis on money launderingskip carouselcarousel previouscarousel nextmoney laundering - a brief historymoney launderingmoney laundering (ppt)money laundering in india a comparative guide to anti-money launderingmoney laundering finalmoney laundering final thesispresentation on money launderingcombating money laundering in nigeria- a legal perspective on the role of central and commercial banks, chitengimoney laundering and hawala transactionmoney launderingaml anti money launderingmoney launderingmoney launderingmoney laundering by twinkle chopramoney launderinganti money laundering..... Launderingmoney laundering report - finalmoney laundering neg effectsbank secrecy act/anti-money laundering examination manualanti money laundering activitiespwc kyc anti money laundering guide 2013anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorismcorruption and financial crimemoney laundering documents about money launderingskip carouselcarousel previouscarousel nextbarriers to asset recoverydraining development? Dialogthis title now requires a credituse one of your book credits to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the t ation bookselectronic booksfilipiniana booksreference bookslaw is the "theses and dissertations" page of the "anti-money laundering " ate page for screenreader to page libraries : subject guides and -money -money : anti-money laundering, commercial crimes, commercial updated: jan 16, updatesemail -visual and es and web back to pathfinders and ing mobile banking system through proportionate anti-money laundering regulations [electronics resource] - trinidad, jay-ryan number: cdtg004973publication date: 2011the philippines is determined to achieve financial inclusion by extending financial services to the unbanked portion of the populace. Among these regulations is the anti – money laundering law requires covered entities, including those engaged in the delivery of mobile banking services, to comply with the following rules, namely; a). On the other hand, reporting ctions and trainings and seminars are not onerous aml rules and hence foster the growth of the is the view of this study that if the country wishes to balance the objectives of financial inclusion and financial integrity, it must provide anti – money laundering policies that inculcate the indicators of proportionate ned in the recommendations. Abstract from the author]bureaucracy-legislature dynamics with the intervention of a multilateral institution : the making of the anti-money laundering law [electronic resource] - brillo, bing number: cdtg005321publication date: 2003the policy making of the anti-money laundering law in the philippines is about the dynamics between the bureaucracy and the legislature on the domestic arena, and a multilateral institution intervening from the outside. Despite the existence of political obligations on the part of the government to enact the anti-money laundering law, the bureaucrats and the legislators have shown strong apathy to its legislation. This bureaucracy-legislatures behavior was anchored on three critical factors: (1) the anti-money laundering law has direct repercussion on the interest of influential domestic actors; (2) the international accords have no compelling sanctions for penalizing noncompliance; and (3) the prevailing jingoistic sentiment among some legislators. Accordingly, the data analysis was presented via following objectives: (1) assessing the fatfs intervention the legislation of the anti-money laundering law; (2) determining the fatfs effect on the dynamics between the bureaucracy and the legislature; and (3) evaluating the fatfs influence in shaping the substance of the d title text                             catalog only peer reviewed                   available in library anti-money laundering provisions of the usa patriot act: a heterogeneous firm model of the banking industry - burak dolar, the university of mississippi, proquest dissertations publishingpublication date: 2007the usa patriot act (patriot act) is an extensive anti-terrorism law that aims to strengthen the nation's defenses against terrorism. The money laundering provisions under title iii of the act target the financial infrastructure of criminal organizations and terrorist groups. The new anti-money laundering (aml) legislation requires the private sector to take a more active role in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. In this dissertation, i use the heterogeneous-firm model of regulation derived from the interest-group theory of government to test whether or not the money laundering provisions of the patriot act led to a wealth transfer from small commercial banks and thrifts to large ones. I also test a number of hypotheses derived from the public-interest theory of government that institutions which are more likely to be targeted by money launderers have been affected more by the new law in terms of compliance burden than the ones which are not. Empirical findings do not support a positive correlation between money laundering risk and compliance burden borne by institutions. Suspicious transaction reporting responsibilities of attorneys in terms of south african anti-money laundering legislative frameworks - dorey, frank. University of pretoria (south africa), proquest dissertations publishingpublication date: 2013with the implementation of more and more stringent measures to prevent money laundering, criminals are resorting to the expertise of lawyers for assistance in the formulation of increasingly complex money laundering purpose of this research is to consider whether the south african anti-money laundering legislation places suspicious transaction reporting obligations, which are in line with and meet international directives, conventions and best practice frameworks, on attorneys. The study entails a consideration of the suspicious transaction reporting obligations of lawyers introduced by the financial action task force, the european union, the united kingdom and south africa and provides an understanding of the concept of money laundering, the money laundering process and the areas in which lawyers are vulnerable to money research found that the suspicious transaction reporting responsibilities of attorneys in terms of south african anti-money laundering legislation are not in line with international frameworks and best practice. Examination of money laundering activities: the united nations' perspective and saudi arabia - alowain, abdulmajeed abdulrahman. California state university, long beach, proquest dissertations publishingpublication date: 2005money laundering has been a plague in many nations around the world. It also resulted from erroneous government policies and the lack of collaboration in the international effects of money laundering are devastating, and the consequences have been severe. While many countries around the world are working to combat money laundering, saudi arabia has made considerable efforts to improve their legal and financial systems by establishing anti-money laundering laws in conjunction with u. With a concerted effort, criminals of money laundering can be brought to justice and future crimes can be prevented. Utica college, proquest dissertations publishingpublication date: 2014the traditional approach to anti-money laundering in banking has been a siloed one, with all of the required facets of the bank secrecy act and the patriot act not necessarily being included. Banks typically operate anti-money laundering efforts at a product or channel level, without collaboration between areas. Money laundering through the use of mortgage financing is an area that has traditionally been overlooked. Successful implementation of an integrated, risk-based, anti-money laundering program requires the commitment of all levels of management, from the board of directors to line level supervisors, as well as the associate level.

In addition to management and employee commitment, a successful, fully integrated anti-money laundering compliance program is cultivated with the appropriate level of resources devoted to advisors, technology, staffing, training, monitoring, data analysis and reporting. Keywords: anti-money laundering, corporate culture, economic crime management, enterprise risk approach, three lines of defense, raymond l. By springshare; all rights a tech support this page in a format suitable for printers and screen-readers or mobile ation bookselectronic booksfilipiniana booksreference bookslaw is the "theses and dissertations" page of the "anti-money laundering " ate page for screenreader to page libraries : subject guides and -money -money : anti-money laundering, commercial crimes, commercial updated: jan 16, updatesemail -visual and es and web back to pathfinders and ing mobile banking system through proportionate anti-money laundering regulations [electronics resource] - trinidad, jay-ryan number: cdtg004973publication date: 2011the philippines is determined to achieve financial inclusion by extending financial services to the unbanked portion of the populace.

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